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How the multilateral financial institutions decide to respond to
the forces for reform in Eastern Europe  - and to advance peace-
building processes in  Africa, South Asia, Indo-China, and
Central America  - could be as important to the advancement of
world order as their support for West European reconstruction
and development was 40 years ago. With major donor countries
focused on Europe, and the passing of Cold War ideological
tensions, the Bretton Woods institutions need more than ever to
represent Third World interests.
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If the Cold War era is ending, the paradigm that  sion, human resource development and other
has framed national security agendas for over 40  ventures will be much more effective if they arc
years must change.  Threats to the environment,  designed and executed within a long-range
instant global communications, access to chang-  strategic framework that encompasses all of
ing science and technology, and deepening  Europe, including the Soviet Union. The inter-
economic interdependence are rapidly eroding  national financial institutions can also help
national sovereignty and blurring distinctions  manage any problems that could emerge if cx-
between foreign and domestic policy.  panding exports from Eastern Europe are
How the multilateral financial institutions  granted preference over products from develop-
decide to respopJ to the forces for economic  ing countries or otherwise disrupt their markets.
reform in Eastem Europe - and .o advance  Finally, multilateral finance and develop-
peace building processes under way or imminent  ment institutions can ease the transition to a new
in Africa, South Asia, Indo-China, and Central  post-bipolar global security regime beneficial to
America - could be as important to the ad-  developing countries.  They can:
vancement of world order as their support for  *  Prepare "watching briefs" on regional and
West European reconstruction and development  civil conflicts to aid long-range planning and
was 40 years ago.  prepare for introducing financial and other
In conflict-plagued regions of the Third  assistance for peacekeeping and peace-building
World, multilateral financial irstitutions will  efforts.
have important new opportunities to support in-  *  Promote greater regional cooperation in
cipient peace processes.  Such efforts could  trade, environmental management, communica-
significantly improve economic growth and  tions, education, and other economically signifi-
reduce poverty in seriously affected countries,  cant links. Today these issues are increasingly
could advance the trend of improving East-West  being perceived by potential partners as essen-
relations, and could strengthen the multilaterals'  tially matters of national and regional security.
authority to biidge security and development  Most successful regional organizations -
issues.  including the European Economic Community
These institutions can help "ripen" peace  - have come together and stayed together for
processes with timely assessments of the eco-  reasons of collective security.
nomic gains from national reconciliation;  help  *  Integrate the democratizing nations of
reinforce peace processes and reduce the risk of  Eastern Europe into the world economy, a
reversibility; and perhaps act as "broker and  process that might eventually engage the Soviet
balancer" by allocating resources to facilitate the  Union.
positive-sum bargains needed to stabilize a  *  Design long-range approaches to involve
nation or region.  developing countries in intemational efforts to
In Eastem Europe, support by the intema-  deal with the degradation of the world's vital
tional financial institutions for market-oriented  atmospheric, marine tropical, water, and biologi-
reforms, economic modemization, trade expan-  cal resources.
The PRE Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work under way in the Bank's Policy, Research, and External
Affairs Complex. An objective of the series is to get these findings out quickly, even if presentations are less than fully
polished. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions in these papers do not necessarily represent official Bank policy.
Produced at the PRE Dissemination  CenterTable  of Contents
I.  SECURITY  FOR DEVELOPMENT  IN A POST-BIPOLAR
WORLD .......................................................  1
Widening  the Scope of  International  Security  ..................  ..................  3
II.  CHANGING  GLOBAL  SECURITY  ENVIRONMENT  ...........  ...........  5
The  Alternative  Ll'½dels .....................  ..................................  6
Soviet 'New  Thinki-.  '  About  Regional  Security ................................  8
U.S. Reaction  to Soviet 'New  Thinking'  About
Reeional  Security  ......................................................  15
Help  from  Japan?  ......................................................  18
Europe's  New  Potential  .....................  .................................  20
The Growing  Importance  of  Regional  Coalitions  ...............  ................  22
Alternatives  to Bipolarity  .........................  .............................  24
III.  PROMOTING  SECURITY  FOR DEVELOPMENT  .............  ...............  26
Peace, Reconciliation,  and  Reconstruction  ........................  .................  27
Strengthening  Regional  Security  ......................................................  29
Anticipating  Global  Security  Requirements
in the  21st Century  .................  .....................................  32
Engaging  the  Soviet Union  .................................  .....................  36
Swords into  Plowshares?  ......................  ................................  39
IV.  CONCLUDING  OBSERVATIONS  .....................................................  41I.  SECURITY  FOR DEVELOPMENT IN A POST-BIPOLAR  WORLD
1.  Wars, and  the  heavy investments  to fight  or deter  them,  continue  to subvert  economic
development  throughout  much  of the world.  Since  1945, nearly  200 civil and  regional  conflicts
have  devastated  poor nations  in Africa,  Asia,  and Latin  America.  In  1987 there  were no less
than  twenty-five  such  wars, a record,  and  all of them  in the  developing  world.,  Nuclear
deterrence  may  have contributed  to peace  between  the  two superpowers,  but  the bipolar  global
security  order  has either  tolerated  or exacerbated  conflict  throughout  much  of the Third  World.
And  wars are only  the most extreme  manifestations  of the insecurities  that afflict  developing
nations.
2.  The accelerating  diffusion  of economic,  political,  and  military  power  within  and
among  nations  is transforming  how all governments  define  and  order  their  vital  interests  and
national security,  but developing  countries  are especially  vulnerable.  The elements  of a
flourishing  economic  base  --  that  complex  mix of rising productivity,  sound  fiscal  and  monetary
policies,  effective  use of science and  technology,  and  a loyal,  educated  and  disciplined  work
force  --  are overshadowing  military  capabilities  as the  modern  indicators  of national  power and
strength.  As many developing  countries  struggle  to overcome debt  and  rekindle  growth,
international  economic  issues that can spark  internal  ethnic  and  other  tensions become  more
readily  identified  with  national  security.
3.  For  more than  forty  years the  world's  principal  multilateral  financial  institutions  have
been  accustomed  to operating  within  a bipolar global security  system  that effectively  precluded
them  from  openly  and  objectively  responding  to the national  and  international  security  concerns
of developing  countries.  Today,  the political  and ideological  foundations  of the Cold  War era
have  been shaken  so fundamentally  that  the  issue of whether  and  how to foster  greater  national
and  regional  security  as a precondition  for  the sustainable  economic  growth of developing
countries  can no  lcnger  be ignored  by  the international  financial  institutions.
1/  Ruth  Leger  Sivard, World Military  and  Social Exoenditures,  (Washington,  D.C.:  World
Priorities)  12 Edition,  1987-88, pp.  28-31.4.  This essay makes no attempt  to prescribe  a strategy  for  designing  and  implementing
ecoromically  productive  security  enhancement  programs.  Rather,  its primary  focus  will be on
the current  restructuring  of the  international  security  system,  with reference  to some of the
possible implications  for  multilateral  development  institutions.  Developing  countries.  already
have had  to adapt  to fundamental  changes in the  global hierarchy,  a process  that  is likely to
accelerate  in the  1990s.
5.  The most noteworthy  change,  but by  no means the only  major  one,  appears  to be the
ending  of the  Cold War.  A second shift  has been  Japan's  rapid  accumulation  of the largest
cache  of  wealth ever  assembled  by one  nation,  while the  U.S. has gone from  being  the  world's
largest creditor  in  1982 to becoming  --  in  just  five  years --  the  world's  largest  debtor.  Japan's
surpassing of  the United  States as the world's  largest donor  of overseas  development  assistance  is
one  indicator  of  the new international  economic  hierarchy.  On another  front,  the creation  of a
unified  European  internal  market  in  1992 and  a corresponding  rise in  that  region's  capacity  to
influence  the  global political economy could eventually  rival Japan's  ascendancy.  The effects  of
these changes,  interacting  with  recent  trends  in policy reform  and  ideological  outlook  throughout
much of the  Third  World, could  create important  opportunities  for  expanding  the scope and
nature  of the  contributions  that international  institutions  can make to  world  peace asd
development.
6.  If the Cold  War continues  to thaw, are conditions  likely to  be more  or less conducive
to security  enhancing  multilateral  initiatives,  including  timely participation  by  the Bretton
Woods institutions?  In addition  to the traditional  role of the UN  in  peace  keeping  and
mediation,  more  proactive  and  far reaching  multilateral  actions  might  include:
--  providing  financial  and  political  incentives  for  national  reconciliation  and  integration
in countries  torn  by civil  strife,  including  the  rebuilding  of capacity  in  public
administration  and  other  forms  of human  capital;
--  assisting  programs  aimed at  reinforcing  regional  peace and  security  agreements;
providing  rewards  and  penalties  for  any  major  changes in a borrower/aid  recipient's
level of  military  expenditures;- 3 -
--  helping develc.)ing countries to meet the costs of participation in the new global
regimes that will be required if a new generation of security concerns, such as threats
to the world's atmosphere, water resources, and biological diversity, are to be
adequately managed.
7.  While the ebbing of the bi-polar ideological competition should eliminate one
contributing factor to the outbreak and escalation of local and regional conflicts, this could also
weaken restraint of local antagonists who no longer need fear superpower interventions.  As
noted below, it is not yet clear whether a definite end of the Cold War, should it occur, would
open the way for joint or parallel actions by the superpowers to promote peace and development
in the Third World, or merely signal their disengagement. Either way, the opportunities for
initiatives by multilateral institutions are likely to increase and in a more multipolar global
environment their importance as a voice for majority of smaller and typically poorer developing
countries will become more vital.
8.  Before turning to the broad outlines of the global security system in transition, it is
imporitant  to rnote  how the scope of "international  security" is chang.ing  in domestic and
international affairs.
Wldenine  the Scone of International Security
9.  The term "international security" is ambiguous  and emotion-laden, greatly
complicating its analytic use, even among those who identify it as their primary scholarly or
professional interest.2 While the exact meaning of "international security" has always been
somewhat elusive, the topics and relevant government institutions have been easy to identify:
preparing and sustaining military defenses, threatening and using military force when necessary,
negotiating and managing alliances and arms control agreements, various intelligence operations;
indeed, almost any problem related to central political problems of threat perception and
management among sovereign states. The scholarship and public understanding of international
security affairs primarily reflected the concepts and policy debates surrounding the emergence
of the Cold War and the development of atomic weapons after World War II.  The field has also
21 Joseph S. Nye, Jr. and Sean M. Lynn-Jones, "International Security Studies:  A Report of a
Conference on the State of the Field," International Security, 12:4, 1988, pp. 5-27-4-
been  dominated  by  those who are most concerned  about  the security  of the  United  States, as the
world's  leading  military  and  economic power.
10.  The international  security  agendas of  all countries  have expanded  enormously  in the
era of complex  interdependence.  This  process  has occurred  in two directions,  greatly
complicating  national  governance  and  international  relations.  Horizontally,  national  security
agendas  are widening  to encompass a host of international  economic,  environmental  and cultural
issues.  While vertically,  the international  dimensions of domestic  politics  and  economic  policies
have  blurred  conventional  distinctions  between  national  and  foreign  affairs.
II.  For all  the recent  talk about  the need  to deal  with international  security  as much  more
than  the range  of military  problems  facing  a particular  government,  there  remains  a fundamental
difference  between  the  situation  of most developing  countries  and  the situation  of  those in the
industrialized  world.  And  it is a distinction  which  Western international  security  experts
typically  overlook.  Whereas the  most vital  security  concern  of  the United  States and  its Western
allies is still  the design  of an adequate  defense  against an external  military  threat,  namely  from
the Soviet Union,  the principal  security  task for  most governments  in the Third  World has been,
and  remains,  a much  more diffuse  challenge.  It  is to build  a viable  nation  ovt of the resources
that each  has available.  This  task will acquire  different  dimensions  in the more  pluralistic
global political economy of  the the  1990s but that  it is unlikely  to become any easier.
12.  Not only are  national  economies much more  highly interdependent  and  affected  by
forces  beyond  the control  of governments,  but the domestic  politics among  nations  also have
become  inter-connected  in powerful  new and  complex  ways.  Rapid  communications  accelerate
the  flow and  power of  ideas, including  the heightened  awareness of  individual  and  group  rights.
An  intricate  changing  web of private,  inter-governmental,  and  government  to non-government
ties strains  the traditional  institutions  of governance.  The search for  "vision" and  "leadership"
have become familiar  themes among  industrialized  democracies,  developing  countries,  and  the
Communist  countries.  Historically,  regional  or globa: order  has been imposed.  top-down  by the
dominant  military/economic  power.  If  the world is poised on  the edge of a  more pluralistic
democratic  global security  order,  what stake will the developing  countries  have  in this  process,
individually  or  through  concerted  efforts  in multilateral  institutions?13.  To put this question in context, the following section of this essay will briefly outline
the historical alternatives to the current global security structure.  In attempting to gauge what
might supplant the bi-polar order, particular attention is given to the 'new thinking' and policy
initiatives coming from Moscow. The American response and the interaction with Japan's
changing role and the emerge. -. of a more unified Europe are also considered.  The final
section of essay weighs the prospects for regional peace and stability, a major precondition for
sustainable development, and outlines several broad options that are likely to become
increasingly available to multilateral institutions for helping to achieve this objective.
II.  THE CHANGING  GLOBAL SECURITY  ENVIRONMENT
14.  Returning from his first trip to the Soviet Union in early June 1988, President
Reagan's public comments were widely read as signaling a truce, if not the end, to forty years
of Cold War. Since then a cottage industry of publications assessing  the end of this era has
sprung up.3 Yet thus far we are without a clear vision of what might replace the bipolar order,
or even a clear strategy for one side or the other as George Kennan outlined for the U.S. in his
famous 1947  "X" article on containment at the onset of the Cold War. 4 Compared to the onset
of the cold war, however, the current challenge to world leaders to produce a politically salient
road map for international relations is a far more complex and subtle exercise.  To be viable this
will take time and require international consensus. Before assessing  wider implications of a
warming trend in U.S.-Soviet relations, and for multilateral development and financial
3/  Much of this literature deals only with 'winners and losers' as in Zbigniew Brezezinski's  The
Grand Failure The Birth and Death of Communism in the Twentieth Century (New
York:1989)  or Robert Heibroner's essay "The Triumph of Capitalism,"  the New Yorker,
January 23, 1989. Many others have focused the dynamics of the relationship, as does the
continuing occasional  series of OpEd 'Is the Cold War Over?" in the New York Times, or
Michael Mandelbaum's "Ending the Cold War," Foreign Affairs, Spring 1989.
4/  More modest, if positive, efforts are being attempted jointly by Soviet and American
scholars to describe the process through which a new relationship might emerge.  The most
ca  Ily developed of these Harvard University's, "Avoiding Nuclear War"  project, has
coi,,cd the rather awkward phrase, "sustainable  peaceful competition", to describe the new
era in East-West relations.  Project leader, Graham Allison, explains the term "sustainable
peaceful competition"  as: "Competition  recognizes real and continuing differences in values
and interests.  The modifier emphasizes the exclusion of the use  or the threat of force...and
the the objective basis for such a relationship must now be institutionalized to make it
sustainable." New York Times February 19, 1989.-6-
institutions,  the  prospects  for  a restructuring  of global security  should  be put in historical
perspective.  For  it may be that  the closing decades  of the this  century  will one day  be viewed
as a major  turning  point  in world  history.
The Alternative Models
15.  Although  there  are  many theoretical  world order  models,  mankind  actually  has had
experience  with  only three.  The most prevalent  appeared  thousands  of years ago.  It may be
characterized  as "universal empire",  systems that  emerge  when one civilization  finally  subjugates
those around  it.  The Han,  Mogul, Islamic and  Roman  empires  are all  examples of civilizations
absorbing  all others  in their  known  world.5 In the contemporary  world of  nuclear  technology,
the imposition  of a universal  empire  is inconceivable  although,  as so many  local wars  in the
Third  World illustrate,  communal  conflicts  over  dominant  cultural,  religious,  or other  basic
values can not  yet be successfully  deterred.
16.  The second model  is the balance  of power system,  a creation  of European  civilization,
that  lasted from  the Treaty  of Westphalia in  1648  until  the outbreak  of World War I in  1914.6
During  that  per.od  the prevailing  international  regime largely  succeeded  in preventing  any state
from  unifying  Europe  and  establishing  an empire  on the continent.  This did not preclude,
however,  the  imperial  conquests  of vast areas now comprising  much of the developing  world.
17.  Sustaining  the balance  of power order  were three  elements: recognition  of the  rights
of  sovereignty;  the creation  of modern  diplomatic  institutions  appropriate  for  serious  bargaining
among  states; and,  the adoption  of  warfare  as an instrument  of national  policy,  rather  than  as a
means of establishing  domination.  War was just  another  means of ensuring  the  balance among
the major  powers  was maintained.  The system  eventually  c-oiiapsed when challenged  by  a
unified  and rapidly  industrializing  Germany.  Germany's  bid for  dominance  coincided  with  the
democratization  of European  countries  which spelled an end  to the  era when  territory  and  other
l/  Robert  Gilpin,  War and  Change in  World Politics,  (New York: Cambridge  University  Press,
1981), Chapter  5 "Hegemonic War and  International  Change."
!/  J.  Morganthau,  Politics Amona  Nations,  (New  York: Knopf,  1978), Part  4, "Limitations  of
National  Power  Balance of  Power;" and  A.F.K.  Organski,  World Politics, (New  York: Knopf,
1968), Chapter  13, "Balance of Power."-7-
assets could be bargained away among royal households. Statesmen found their room to bargain
increasingly circumscribed by domestic pressures. War, if it was to be undertaken, required the
mobilization  of industry and of the masses, as occurred in World War I.
18.  The third model, which may be short live 1, is today's bipolar system, which arose
immediately after the total defeat of the surgir.g imperialisms  of German Nazism and Japanese
militarism.  At its heart, the bipolar order is more akin, in intent, to warring civilizations than it
is another variation of the balance of power model.  For forty years Communist ideology has
been the  lodestone of world politics.  Denying Soviet foreign policy opportunities to advance
these ideals, after all, has defined the vital security interests of the United States and structured
the argument for its foreign policy, a fact no other nation could afford to ignore.  The effect of
the competition on the United Nations and its affiliated institutions has been, in varying
degrees, to subvert their original purposes. Even those multilatcral institutions in finance and
development, to which the Soviet Union does not belong, have become unavoidably entangled in
the Cold War struggle.
19.  Nuclear weapons, however, have greatly inhibited the intensity of the ideological
conflict; mutual deterrence, rather than domination by force, has been at the model's core.  For
the first time in history, war has not been an option for deciding the outcome in a struggle for
global dominance. And now, after barely forty years of stalemate, this same bipolar order
appears to be cracking under economic  and political strains that are both internal and external to
each alliance system.  The limits of the bipolar order have been evident almost from its
inception, e.g., Yugoslavia's  defection from the Soviet bloc, or de Gaulle's assertion of French
independence within the Western alliance.  But, following the elevation of Mikhail Gorbachev as
General Secretary of Soviet Communist Party, however, the decline of the Cold War took a more
dramatic and fundamental turn.
20.  The principal reason for the change in Soviet policy appears to be that East-West
competition has become far too expensive at time when the new leadershil seeks to restructure
the country's economy, political institutions and foreign relations. 7 Few in the West, however,
2/  See: Brzezinski, OD.  cit., and Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great PQwers,  (New
York:Random  House, 1987),  see especially "The Soviet Union and Its Contradictions."  pp
488-514; For background to the Gorbachev era see: The Doniestic  Context of Soviet Foreian
Polic,  Seweryn Bialer, ed., (Boulder Co.: Westview, 1981); and for insights into the current
Continued on next page-8-
anticipated  the scope  and  fra..kness  of Gorbachev's  recognition  of the limits to Soviet influence
in the  Third  World.  Nor was it anticipated  that  he would make Soviet restraint  and  peace
initiatives  in the Third  World a key element  in a  global political  strategy  to persuade  the West to
permit  the Soviet Union  greater  access to international  capital,  technology  and  other  essential
ingredients  for  economic  restructuring  and development  at  home.8
Soviet 'New Thinking' About  Regional Security
21.  The statements  and  evident  policy  shifts  toward  the Third  World emanating  from  the
Soviet Union  have already  significantly  altered  the  nature  of the  U.S.-Soviet  r'  y and  the
opportunities  for  expanding  the role of multilateral  institutions.  The  most dra.r.dtic  step  in this
direction  occurred  on  the afternoon  of February  8,  1988 when  Radio Moscow broadcast  a
declaration  by  Gorbachev  of  his intention  to withdraw  all Soviet troops from  Afghanistan. 9
Gorbachev  we  on. in the sarmie  statement  to pledge his government's  determination  to "spare no
effort"  to resolve peacefally  other  regional  conflicts--in  the Middle  East,  Cambodia,  Central
America  and  southern  Africa.
22.  Since then,  Soviet troop withdrawal  from  Afghanistan  and  various  indications  of
political  and diplomatic  support  for  the nascent  peace  processes in Southeast  Asia,  Angola and
Central  America,  suggest that  the commitment  to curtail  foreign  entanglements  in  regional
conflicts  is real.10  From  Gorbachev's  other  writings,  notably  a lengthy  article  entitled  "The
Reality  and Guarantees  of a Secure  Worlc;,"  and  his widely  quoted  December  7,  1988 address  to
Continued  from  previous  page
debate  see: Philip  D. Stewart  and  Margaret  G.  Herman,  "The Soviet Debate  over 'New
Thinking'  and  'Restructuring'  of IJ.S.-Soviet  Relations,"  forthcoming  in  the The Third
Revolution  in Soviet National  Security Policy,  George  Hudson,  ed.
/  Sir Michael  Howard,  "Meeting New Challenges,  The Gorbachev  Challenge  and  the Defense
of  the West" in Survival,  Novembe-'w)ecember  1988.
2/  Transcript  of Radio  Moscow brnadcast  of Gorbachev  Statement  on Afghanistan,  FBIS-Sov-
88025, 8 February  1988.
jQ/  Interviews  by the  author  with Soviet foreign  ministry  and  Party officials  in  Moscow during
Dezember  1988 and  May  1989 visits strongly  reinforce  this  impression,  as have  separate
incerviews with officials  from several  Asian, African  and  Latin  American  countries
involved  in regional  conflicts.- 9 -
the  United  Nations,  a new picture  of Soviet priorities  in the Third  World is beginning  to
emerge.' 1
23.  Back *n the  1970's, Soviet unilateral  actions  i:  the  Th,rd  World typically  were
defended  on  ideological  grounds  as part of  the global class struggle against  the evils of
imperialism.  They  were also justified  as the "right" of a superpower  whose status of nuclear
parity  had  recently  beei, formally  acknowledged  in the SALT I agreement.  Unde,  Gorbachev  the
realities  are seen quite  differently.  As one  of his close advisers  recently  observed: "The
experience  of  the the  past two decades  suggests that  the  more deeply  we (the United  States and
the Soviet Union)  get involved  in rf  ial  conflicts,  militarily  particularly,  the greater  the
damage to our  interna.ional  influence,  reputation  and  prestige."12 To quote Gorbachev  again:
"no one can guarantee  the status  quo, all peoples have  sovereignty  to choose the roads or forms
of development,  including  the  right  of the social status quo."13
24.  This  'live  and let  live'  attitude  appears  to  be a function  of at  least three  basic
concerns.  The one  already  noted and  that  has received  the most attention  internationally,  is the
need  to reduce  the high  financial  cost of maintaining  weak clients  in the Third  Wolid.  One of
the more  ironic  twists  in defense  of these cut-backs  is that the  Western powers  had  inflamed
regional  conflicts  in order  to attract  Soviet counter  measures  as part of a strategy  to cause the
"economic weakening  of the Soviet Union,  and  forcing  it to dissipate  its resources  in many
directions."14
25.  A  second interest  is not to complicate  relations  with  the United  States and  the Western
Allies.  For many  years the Soviets argued  that  what they  did in the  Third  World was an
ji/  M.S. Gorbachev,  "The Realities  and Guarantees  of a Secure  World," Pravda,  17 September
1987; also, Y.Primakov,  "New Philosophy  of foreign  Policy," Pravda,  9 July  1987; and,
"Studio 9," Program  Views Regional Conflicts,  presented  by  V. Zorin,  with  Y.M. Vorontsov,
First  Deputy  Minister  of Foreign  Affairs,  and  K.N.  Brutents,  deputy  Chief  of  the
International  Department  of the CPSU Central  Committee,  27  February  1988, FBIS-Sov-
88-039.  Gorbachev  U.N. Speech,  New York Times,  December  8, 1988.
D2/  Y. Primakov,  interview  with  author,  Moscow, February  16, 1988.
Dj/  M.S. Gorbachev,  17 September  1987, g2.git.
14/  V. Zhurkin,  "Old and  Ne'sv  Challenges  to Security,"  Kommunist,  No.  1, January  1988.- 10  -
entirely  separate  matter  from  their relationship  with the  United  States and  part of the  historical
trend  toward  world socialism.  Now they  admit  linkage is a political  fact  of life  and  do not want
thieir actions in regional  conflicts  to undercut  the current  efforts  to conclude  new arms control,
economic,  scientific  and other  important  agreements.  The interventions  in Angola and  Ethiopia
they  now recognize  hurt  the  SALT II negotiations,  even before  the  Afghanistan  invasion killed
any chance  of ratification.  There  is also a growing  appreciation  in  Moscow that  the image of
'adventurism'  in the developing  world  once hurt  their  campaign against  the deployment  of
intermediate  range  nuclear  missiles in Europe  and  could in the  future  hurt  prospects  for  raising
foreign  capital  and securing  other  forms  of economic,  technical  and  political assistance  from
Western Europe  and  Japan.  15 By showing restraint  and  promoting  peace  processes Soviet
analysts further  suggest  that  this  should facilitate  the USSR's expanded  cooperation  with  the
international  financial  institutions  including  the  World Bank.
26.  Finally,  an element  in  'new  thinking'  about  regional  conflicts  is the  desire  for  more
extensive  economic  relations  with developing  countries  in order  to earn  more  foreign  exchange
through  trade  and  gain easier  access to urgently  needed technology,  particularly  from  the newly
industrializing  countries  of Southeast  Asia.  Indeed,  this  may have  been a little  noticed
secondary  objective  behind  the decisions  to withdraw  from  Afghanistan  and  to encourage  ine
Vietnamese  to pull out of Cambodia.  As Elizabeth  Valkenier  notes: "Soviet economic strategies
today are  a far cry  from  the original  aim of weaning the Third  World from  capitalist  markets.
Moscow has come to accept the  fact of  worldwide  economic  interdependence,  thus calling  into
question  the utility  of separate  East-South  deals and encouraging  greater  East-West-South
cooperation."' 6
27.  Soviet disengagement  from  regional  conflicts  is easier  talked  about  than  done.  Issues
of  prestige,  future  credibility,  and  internal  dissent of Soviet military  and  other  hardliners  who
will accuse Gorbachev  of 'losing'  the hard  won gains of the  1970's no doubt  are all  par'  of a
G0/  George W. Breslauer,  in a path-breaking  analysis of high-ranking  foreign  affairs  personnel
in the Soviet government  reveals that  the regional  specialists who  have typically  served  as
directors  of bureaus  dealing  with  Asia,  Latin America,  the Middle  East  and  Africa  have
been replaced  by experts  on  the United  States.  G.W. Breslauer,  "All Gorbachev's  Men" in
The National  Inte:est  Summer  i988.  pp. 91-100.
j  Elizabeth  Valkenier,  "New Soviet Thinking  About  the Third  World," World Policy Journal,
Fall 1987, pp. 651-674.- II  -
complex political process. The Soviets also remain by far the major source of arms to the Third
World,  and most of these are bartered or sold for hard currency. 17 Yet outlines for a strategy to
*unblock"  the resolution of regional conflicts are becoming clear.
28.  Senior Gorbachev advisors say that the first element in the new policy toward regional
conflicts should be to disentangle them from the Cold War zero-sum mind-set of U.S.- Soviet
relations.  Foreign Ministry officials, analysts at the International Department of the Central
Committee and at the Academy of Sciences  Institutes, eagerly talk about possibilities for
resolving regional conflicts through joint or parallel U.S.-Soviet approaches.'8
29.  A second Soviet objective, that has been articulated with increasing authority in the
unofficial private discussions and publicly,  is to promote political, rather than military,
solutions to regional conflicts that can peacefully accommodate  the complex and volatile
indigenous political, economic and/or cultural forces that are largely beyond the control of
either superpower.  The Soviet solution to the cultural diversity and conflict in the developing
world is now to call for 'governments of national reconciliation.'  Soviet officials readily
acknowledge that the record of such coalitions, particularly when the conflicts have escalated to
internationalized civil wars, is not good.  But they appropriately note that if the combatants are
deprived of the option to play off the two superpowers, as frequently occurred during the
E2/ Sivard, o  p. 10.
I/  This theme began to emerge in unofficial meetings between U.S. and Soviet foreign policy
analysts in early 1987. The most extensive and sustained discussions  of how regional
conflicts affect, and can be affected by U.S.-Soviet relations have occurred under the
auspices of the Dartmouth Conference, a high level exchange of private views on the
overall U.S.-Soviet relationship that was proposed by President Dwight Eisenhower and has
been meeting annually since 1960. In September a small sub-group on southern Africa,
chaired by Gleb Starachenko and John Stremlau, reached agreement on a very general
scenario for a  joint and/or parallel actions to by the U.S. and the Soviet Union aimed at
promoting an end of apartheid in southern Africa.  Since then the Dartmouth Conference
Task Force on Regional Conflicts has made significant progress in developing a cross-
regional framework for clarifying relative U.S. and Soviet interests and the prospects for
confidence building in the Middle East, Southwest Asia, Central America and Southern
Africa, at February 1988 discussions  in Moscow, another session the following December in
New York, and a third  round in May 1989 in Moscow. The Task Force is chaired by
former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Harold Saunders and the Head of the Soviet
Academy of Sciences Institute of World Economics  and Politics, Y. Primakov. Complete
non-attributed records of the meetings of the Dartmouth Conference Regional Conflicts
Task Force, that began in  1981  following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, can be
obtained from Robert Lehman, The Kettering Foundation, 200 Commons Road, Dayton,
Ohio 45459-2799.- 12 -
height  of  the cold  war, greater  pressure  in support  of national  reconciliation  may  bring  results.
Although  it is too early  to judge  its operational  significance,  this  seems to be very  much part  of
the more  pervasive shift  away from a preference  for  chaos in  the non-communist  world to a
quest  for  international  stability.
30.  The final  element  in the  new policy line follows  from  the other  two and  places new
emphasis on  multilateral  approaches  for  reducing  conflict  and  promoting  development  in the
Third  World.  This theme  was central  in Gorbachev's  article  "The Reality  and Guarantees  of a
Secure  World," and  in numerous  statements  by  his representative  to the United  Nations.  Over
the  past year  Moscow's re-discovery  of the  United  Nations  has become one  of the most
intriguing  and  potentially  significant  twists in Soviet foreign  policy.
31.  After  many  years to trying  to exploit  the North-South  split  at the  United  Nations,  the
tone  and actions  of Soviet represuntatives  have  turned  non-confrontational.  Suddenly,  they  have
agreed to  pay some $200 million  in arrears  to the United  Nations  and  their delegation  is calling
for  a sweeping  new  "comprehensive system of international  peace  and  security."19 As Edward
Luck  and  Toby Trister  Gati  documented  last year,  in one of the  first  studies  of shifts  in Soviet
policy at  the  United  Nations,  rhetoric  has frequently  outpaced  actions and  often  new proposals
have  not replaced  the old Soviet agenda but simply coexist  with it.20 Indications  of growing
Soviet interest  in multilateralism  are  evident,  however,  in such diverse  places as Afghanistan,
Angola,  Lebanon,  the  Persian Gulf,  the GATT,  the IAEA,  UNESCO,  the Common  Fund  for
commodities,  and  the U.N.  General  Assembly.
32.  Further  evidence  of the widening  scope  of Soviet thinking  about  the  role that  the
U.N.  should play  in the  1990s appears in an April  1989 joint  statement  by  the  United  Nations
Association  of  the USA and  the Soviet UN  Association  on "The UN's  Role  in Enhancing  Peace
and  Security."  The  report  is the  first  in series  to be followed  by others  on  international
economic  cooperation,  the environment,  humanitarian  concerns,  and  other  topics.  Although  still
12/  V. Petrovsky,  Deputy  Head of Delegation of the USSR to the  United  Nations,  "Towards
Comprehensive  Security  Through  the Enhancement  of  the Role of  the United  Nations,"
aide-memoire,  22 September  1988.
ZQ/  Edward  C. Luck  and Toby Trister  Gati,  "Gorbachev,  the United  Nations and  U.S. Policy,"
The Washington Ouarterlv,  Autumn  1988, pp.  19-35.- 13 -
"unofficial"  the joint  UNA  panel  deserves  attention  as it is chaired  on  the U.S. side  by
Ambassador  Richard  Gardner  and on  the Soviet side  by Vladimir  Shustov,  Chief  of Research
Coordination  Department  of the Ministry  of Foreign  Affairs  and Ambassador  Victor  Issraelyan.
The first  report  is particularly  noteworthy  for  its emphasis  on the  need for  strengthening  the
role of  the Secretary  General  in "preventative  diplomacy"  to reduce the  risk of conflict,  rather
than  peacekeeping  following  the cessation of  hostilities,  and  in linking  such efforts  to economic
development  and  a more comprehensive  view of security.
33.  Given  the domestic  pressures  on  Soviet foreign  exchange  it is doubtful  that  they  will
soon become major  players  in UN economic  bodies,  even  though  they  apparently  want  to
become more  fully  integrated  into the global economy.21  Between  1980 and  1986 their  annual
voluntary  contributions  to the U.N. specialized  agencies  nearly doubleu  to $14 million,  but that
is only  3% of  the U.S. total of $468 million.2 2 They  have become observers  at the  Asian
Development  Bank and  Soviet officials  express  frustration  that  they have  not been able  to
expand  their  involvement  in that  Bank,  and  that  their  inquiries  about  possible co-financing
arrangements  with  the  World Bank thus far  have not received  a positive  response.
34.  Although  Soviet officials  recognize  that  World Bank membership  is a distant
objective,  subsequent  to reaching  an agreement  with the  International  Monetary  Fund,  they are
actively  seeking  opportunities  to expand  contacts  with  the Bretton  Woods Institutions  so as to
"learn how the system  works."2 3 Such explorations  include  extensive  visits to Poland and
Hungary  to inquire  about  how those nations  deal with  the Bank and  Fund.
35.  'Interdependence'  has become a  new by-word  in Gorbachev's  foreign  policy speeches;
there  has even been  discovered  a  long forgotten  quote  of Lenin,  who  in  1899 wrote  that  it is
good Marxism  "that  the common  interests  of mankind  are higher  than  the  class interests  of the
aii Abel Aganbegyan,  "The Economics of Perestroika,"  International  Affairs,  Spring  1988, pp.
177-86; Nikolay Shmelev, "Problems of Funding  Restructuring,"  Moscow News,  7 February
1988, FBIS Sov-88-030.
22/  Luck  and  Gati,  gpgcit. p.25.
2./  Interviews  with  Shmelev and  Ivan Ivanov,  April  1988.- 14  -
proletariat." 24 Although the real meaning of the terminology is still very unclear,
'interdependence' evidently transcends the strategic concerns of the nuclear balance and includes
natural resources, ecology, science and technology, and the plight of poor countries.  All of
these 'global issues' feature prominently in Gorbachev's writings about international affairs.  His
comments about conditions in Africa are indicative of the scope of this 'new thinking' about
international security:
A world in which a whole continent can find itself on the brink of death
from starvation and in which huge masses of people are suffering is not a
safe world.  Neither is a world safe in which a multitude of countries and
peoples are stifling in a noose of debt.25
36.  How the above concerns with problems of international development relate to
Gorbachev's avowed first priority, to end peacefully regional conflicts, is not yet known.
Historically, Soviet development assistance has concentrated on helping those few nations who
have allied themselves politically and militarily with Moscow. 26 Because most of these
countries are directly or indirectly engaged in regional conflicts, there should be evidence soon
of significant shifts in the levels and direction in Soviet development assistance. Perhaps a
harbinger of change was Moscow's recent decision to join the multilateral donors group for
humanitarian relief in Ethiopia and to commit to purchase 250,000 tons of Argentine grain for
the campaign.
37.  Until very recently, outside analysts have not had much access to Soviet thinking
about the priorities and impact of their bi-latpral aid program.  A forthcoming book for the
Overseas Development  Council on the prospects for joint U.S.-Soviet cooperation in Third World
Development  contains three lengthy segments authored by a team of seven Soviet economists
L4/  Alexander Dallin, 'Gorbachev's Foreign Policy and the 'New Political Thinking' in the
Soviet Union," in Gorbachev's Reforms, Peter Juviler and Hiroshi Kimura, eds.,
(Hawthorne, NY; Aldine de Gruyter,  1988) p. 102.
21/ Gorbachev, September 17, 1987, op. cit.
26/ Abe S. Becker, "The Soviet Union and the Third World:  the  Economic Dimension," in _ he
Soviet Union  and the Third World. Andrei Korbonski and Francis Fukuvama, eds., (Ithaca,
NY: Cornell, 1987), pp. 67-93.- 15 -
from the Institute of World Economic  and Politics. The Soviet essays  are entitled: "The Strategy
of Developments  and Aid to Developing  Countries,"  "Soviet  Economic Aid: Quantitative and
Qualitative Analysis,"  and "Aid in the Development  of Education and Training of Personnel." 27
Not only do these chapters detail the kinds and direction of Soviet aid, but they explain and
criticize past funding strategies.  The jointly authored summary chapter by Elena Arefyeva and
U.S. economist W. Donald Bowles includes a rather sweeping statement of the new collective
wisdom:  'Today, in effect, East and West views both acknowledge the important role that
markets can play in development, the crtical  needs in agriculture, the stimulating effects of
exports, and the importance of limiting the sphere of government activities." 28 Such language
is, of course, consistent with the rhetoric and policy reforms that mark Gorbachev's domestic
program.
U.S.  Reaction  to Soviet 'New Thinking'  About Reaional  Security
38.  U.S. attitudes toward recent Soviet pronouncements  have been cautious.  After all, the
deep split in American political life still exists between those who instinctively view the Soviets
as evil "power maximizers"  bent on world domination and those who see their international
behavior as another great power, a "mirror image" of the U.S. 29 The ratio of supporters for
each point of view, however, appears to be rapidly charging.  A national public opinion polling
on this subject, done just prior to the 1988  U.S. presidential campaign by Daniel Yankelovich on
behalf of the Public Agenda Foundation, indicates a broad based improvement in the public's
attitude toward the Soviet Union.  The shift, however, is tentative and the survey suggests  that
it will be sensitive to Soviet behavior in the developing world. 30
39.  Below are a few of the more specific findings:
D  R.M. Avakov, E.B. Arefyeva, E.A. Bragino-,a,  L.Z. Zevin, M.P. Strepetova, N.A. Usakova,
and A.I. Chekhutov. The three essays will appear in a book to be published by the Overseas
Development Council, Washington,  D.C., tentatively titled "Prospects  for US-USSR Joint
Efforts in Development Assistance."
/  Ibid. Chapter IV.
/ Charles Wolf, Jr., "Extended Containment," in Beyond Containment, Aaron Wildavsky,  ed.,
(Westlake  Village, CA;  ICS Press, 1983),  pp. 147-68.
XQ/ U.S.-Soviet Relations in the Year 2010: Americans Look to the Future. Public Summit '88,
A Report of the Public Agenda Foundation and the Center for Foreign Policy Development
at Brown University. (New York. Public Agenda Foundation, 1988).- 16 -
Asked how  nuclear  war might  start,  only  15% of Americans  said they  fear
direct  attack  on  the U.S. by the Soviet Union.  Far more  likely in the
public  mind  is escalation  of a Third  World conflict,  use of nuclear
weapons by  terrorists,  or accident  or miscalculation  by one of  the nuclear
powers.
Asked where  the  U.S. might be drawn  into war, Central  America  and  the
Middle  East  were named  by well over half  of Americans,  whereas  only 7%
of Americans  felt  it was likely that  war might start  in Europe.
Asked to rate  threats  to the  nation's  security,  drugs,  terrorism  and  the
trade  deficit  are judged  to be more dangerous  to the country's  future  than
the  spread  of communism  by the Soviets.
56% of Americans  say that  Japan  poses a greater  danger  to the national
security  of the U.S. than  does the U.S.S.R.
And  on  a more personal  level, when asked  to rate over  20 of the  world's
leaders,  Gorbachev  received ratings  equal  to Pope John  Paul (65%); only
Margaret  Thatcher  (69%) is ranked  higher.
40.  Of the  two primary  elements that  define  the U.S.-Soviet  bipolar  security  order,  the
nuclear  arms race and  regional  security  issues, Soviet and  American  interventions  in the Third
World have become more salient  indicators  of changes in world  dominance  patterns  than  the
status of arcane  debates  about  nuclear  force  structures,  including  the  more topical  issues of 'star
wars'  and  deep cuts.  In Moscow, Soviet analysts are  again calling  for  a "code of conduct"  to set
limits on superpower  involvement  in  regions of the developing  world,  but the U.S. has shown
little  interest.  Back in  1972 the two governments  reached agreement  on  a list of  "Basic
Principles" that  covered  regional  conflicts.  It  was appended  to the SALT I treaty  and,  inter  alia,
committed  each side not to seek unilateral  advantage  in regional  conflicts.  No effort  was made
to negotiate  critical  operational  issues and  almost before  the ink was dry  the  two countries  were
busy charging  unilateral  advantage  had  been exploited  by the  other  in the  Middle-East  and  in
Africa.- 17 -
41.  Reaching  even  tacit  understandings  about  terms of acceptable  and  unacceptable
regional  involvement  will require  an infinitely  more complex political  process  than  concluding  a
strategic  arms control  agreement.  Negotiating  nuclear  arms reduction,  -.fter  all, is essentially a
two player  game,  where  assets can be counted  and  agreements  verified.  Regional  conflicts,  by
definition,  are multiplayer  affairs  where  passions run  deep and  in response to often  highly
diverse  mixes of profoundly  different  cultural  and  political values.  And,  of course,  there  are
the  deep divisions  over  the nature  and  importance  of change in the developing  world  within  the
U.S. and  increasingly  within  the  Soviet policy making  communities.
42.  Publicly,  the  U.S. government's  response to Gorbachev  has been  broadly  positive,  yet
carefully  hedged  on the  particulars  of arms control or the prospect  for  U.S.-Soviet  joint  or
parallel  actions  for  reducing  tensions in  the Third  World.31  Much  less publicized  have  been  the
accelerating  contacts  between  the two governments,  notably  the  meetings  at  the level of assistant
secretary  of state to discuss regional  conflicts.  The December  22,  1988 Tripartite  Agreement
that  was signed  in New  York by  Angola, Cuba,  and  South Africa  for  implementing  Nambian
independence  and  Cuban  withdrawal  from  Angola was facilitated  by  the U.S. and  the Soviet
Union.  This  super-power  cooperation  was not only of practical  importance,  but is seen as a
symbolic milestone  toward  East-West cooperation  because  their  1970's competitive  involvement
on Angola  played such a prominent  role in the collapse  of their  last effort  at  detente.
43.  If Soviet 'adventurism'  continues  to wane,  and  if Moscow shows a genuine  interest  in
resolving  regional  conflicts  by political  means, then  logically it might  be assumed  that  the  U.S.
would become  less wary  to multilateral  initiatives.  But this  may not follow,  as the October  1988
refusal  by the  U.S. Senate to support  an administration  request  for  $150 million  for  U.N.
peacekeeping  operations  illustrates.3 2 Furthermore,  the  huge U.S. budget  and  trade  deficits  will
severely  constrain  Washington from  providing  new funds  for  multilateral  reconstruction  and
f_/  Two events during  1986-88  reinforced  the normal skepticism  among  the  western allies of
any  proposal  emanating  from  Moscow: the dismay of the  European  NATO  members over
the unexpected  near  agreement  for  deep  cuts in  nuclear  weapons at  the October  11-12,  1986
Reykjavik  Summit;  and,  the  1988 presidential  campaign.  Upon  taking  office,  President
George  Bush launched  a major  policy  review  of  U.S.-Soviet  relations  that produced  a
further  note  of caution;  "status quo  plus" was the public  label given  to report  by,  General
Brent  Scowcroft,  the  President's  national  security  adviser.
32/  New York Times,  October  23,  1988.- 18 -
development programs.  In the  1990s  the U.S. will face the choice of either retreating into
isolation or devising new formulas for sharing global leadership with the other majc- powers,
Japan, Western  Europe and the Soviet Union.  This could, however, open important
opportunities for multilateral institutions with the vision and energy to promote such
collaboration.
Helm from  JananZ
44.  Japan's emergence in the late 1980's as the key international economic player, with a
trade surplus of $80 billion, has aroused much speculation about Tokyo's global intentions.
"Interdependence"  has become the by-word of Japanese foreign policy and the focal point for an
historic domestic debate about that nation's global responsibilities. Although the operational
meaning of 'interdependence" remains unclear, it suggests  a growing appreciation among
Japanese that they are entering a new era that will require them to be more open and generous
in their international relationships. Furthermore, there appears to be a distinctive element in the
Japanese view of "global interdependence"  that emphasizes  the growing importance of
multilateral institutions, a convergence  of strategic interests between Japan and the multilaterals
that is unique, potent, and wide-ranging.
45.  As Japan Scholar Marius Jansen notes, it is the only major power that can afford no
enemies, is not fenced in by a pattern of armament and regional alliance, has the only major
industrial plant that is quite free from reliance upon the provision of military equipment for
itself and others, and is relatively unthreatened by its neighbors. 33 For over forty years
policies of military and political restraint have co-mingled with aggressively  competitive
economic behavior.
46.  Whether this policy mix is sustainable or serves Japan's long range interests is the core
issue in the national debate that has been brewing and that is likely to accelerate as the political
system struggles to overcome the current recent bribery scandal.  How the Japanese eventually
decide to order their international economic  and security priorities to strengthen their domestic
political institutions to ensure that the latent hostility of its neighbors remains in check, and to
2I/  Marius B. Jansen, Jagan and It's World, (Princeton, New Jersey:  Princeton University
Press, 1980) p. 113.- 19  -
secure access to vital markets and resources around the world continues, will have a major
impact on the prospects for global stability and prosperity.  There is also the potential for
important and creative interdependencies  to develop between Japan, the UN, the IMF, and the
World Bank.
47.  By channeling significant amounts of its huge surplus through multilateral institutions,
Tokyo also acquires the much needed technical capacity that it currently lacks to ensure that the
funds -re  .11  spent in the developing world.  More importantly, partnership with the World
Bank should please those Japanese voters who worry about their country's isolation
internationally.  It should also enhance Japan's prestige in the developing world, strengthen its
standing with its OECD partners, and not displease the Soviets. The Bank, meanwhile, gains a
major partner that is independent, though certainly not equidistant, from the two superpowers
and one that is also free of any capacity to dominate its neighbors militarily.
48.  Recent actions by the Japanese government are encouraging. Explaining his
government's announcement last June to earmark $50 billion to be spent from  1988  to 1992 on
overseas development assistance, double its current rate, Prime Minister Takeshita stressed
Japan's interest in promoting regional security and development. Speaking to a group in Chicago
on June 22, 1988, he outlined his "International Cooperation Initiative" comprising three pillars:
contributions to peace, international cultural exchange, and development. In particular, he noted
that. his government was about to fund, for the first time, peace-keeping operations in the
Middle-East;  was about to participate in an international civilian observer team in Afghanistan,
where financial assistance would also be rendered; and, would "...actively provide economic
assistance for refugee relief and, with the ending of regional conflicts, give reconstruction
assistance." 34
49.  On October 6, 1988  the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs released the report on
Japan's official development assistance  (ODA) for fiscal year 1988 which reached $7.454 billion,
a 32% increase in Yen terms. 35 In 1989  Japan surpassed the U.S. to become the world's largest
donor of ODA.  Already Japan's share in the total flow of funds from industrialized nations to
i4/  Press Release, Consulate General of Japan, New York, June 23, 1988.
XJ  Japan's ODA 1988, Overview, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, provisional
translations, December 1988, unpublished.- 20  -
developing  countries  (ODA plus other  government  and  private  sector funds)  amounts  to 24.3%,
some $20.46 billion,  the  highest  in the world.  Traditionally,  Japan's  ODA  has been concentrated
in Asia but  increasing  attention  is being  given to aiding  the  least developed  countries,
particularly  in Africa.  At  the same time the  Japanese government  also declared  its intention  to
provide  aid that  is much  less restricted  and  that  will be geared  to promoting  "peace and  stability
of the  international  community,  and the  reduction  of poverty  in developing  countries."  In
recent  years  that has  been a significant  increase  in "strategic aid for  countries  bordering  on areas
of conflict,"  such as Pakistan,  Turkey,  Egypt  and  Jamaica.  Although  primarily  a response  to
U.S. calls for  Japanese burden  sharing of  the cost of maintaining  global security,  this  "strategic
aid" also reflects  widening  Japanese  interests  in  peace building  and  peace  keeping.  Tokyo's
support  for  expanding  U.N.  efforts  to promote  regional  security  in South  Asia and  in backing
greater  activism  by multilateral  institutions  in the  1990s.
Europe's  New  Potential
50.  If Japan's  ascending  world  market  power  and  economic surpluses  create  new
opportunities  for  multilateral  institutions,  so too will Europe's  emergence  as a collective  force  in
world affairs.  When the unified  internal  market  agreements  go into effect  in  1992 the
community  of twelve western  powers  will encompass some 320 million  people  and have  a gross
regional  product  bigger  than  that  of the U.S. and Japan.  Moreover,  how an  integrating
democratic  Western Europe  interacts  with the  forces  for  change in Central  and  Eastern  Europe
could  become the critical  element  in a successful transition  from  a  bi-polar  to a multi-polar
system of global security.
51.  The issue that  lies at  the heart  of current  European  politics  and  the future  of East-
West relations  is not whether  the  world's  two great  alliance systems  will endure,  but whether  and
how  their  respective  rates  of dissolution  can be kept  sufficiently  close to avoid  a military
confrontation  and  any  risk of nuclear  war.  How the  multilateral  financial  institutions  decide  to
respond  to  the forces  for  economic  reform  in  Eastern  Europe  could  be as important  to the
advancement  of  world order  as their support  for  West European  reconstruction  and  development
forty  years ago.
52.  Already,  the role of the IMF and  the World Bank in  facilitating  economic  reform  in
Poland  and  Hungry  has been described  by  U.S. officials  as a principal  currency  of East-West- 21 -
relations, as important as strategic arms reduction talks as a measure of change U.S.-Soviet
relationship. This political reality will no doubt cause discomfort for the IMF and the World
Bank, yet to ignore it could prove to be more dangerous than prudent.
53.  Eastern European economic reformers, after all, are devising policies never before
attempted; reliable guidelines for dismantling centrally planned economies do not exist and such
experimentation must be carried out with the support of highly politicized publics who have
been antagonized by pabt failures and with the tolerance of a powerful neighbor whose own
government might fall should its hegemonic  role in the region appear threatened.  Active
support by the International Financial Institutions in the reform process can provide local policy
makers  more options,  resources,  and  authority  --  economic  and  political  --  foi  I a-.ncing
interests and building consensus. As a recent report by the Institute fur East- WHet  &:;curity
Studies concludes: support by the international financial institutions for policy ieforms,
structural adjustment, trade expansion, technical cooperation and other joint ventures with the
West, will be much more effective if they are designed and executed within a long range
strategic framework that encompasses  all of the European region, including the Soviet Union. 36
54.  If the international financial institutions are able to play a vital role in the successful
economic restructuring of Eastern Europe countries and thereby help to advance East-West
cooperation this could reduce the risk that European donors will become so preoccupied with
their own regional concerns that they will neglect the needs of developing countries. 37 The
international financial institutions can also help manage any problems that could emerge should
expanding exports from CMEA countries be granted preference over products from developing
countries or otherwise disrupt their markets.
h/  Gevasina Bissolino, Laszlo Lang, Paul McCarthy and Katarzyna Zukowska, "Toward A New
East-West Security Relationship: the Economic  Agenda," conference paper, Seventh Annual
Conference, Institute for East-West Security Studies, Potsdam, German Democratic
Republic, June 9-11, 1988.
3_/  A rather dramatic indication of this new interest in helping finance economic  activity in the
Soviet Union was the report that over the ten days beginning October 10, 1988, commercial
banks in Western  Europe and Japan pledged a total of $9 billion in loans to Moscow's  Bank
for Foreign Economic Affairs, $1 billion more than the total new lending to the Soviet
Union during the three years ending December 31, 1987. New York Times, October 20,
1988.- 22  -
55.  Between  now and  1992 there  will be much international  debate  over  whether  Europe's
intense  preoccupation  with  internal  matters  signals a new form of  isolationism,  a "fortress
Europe" as some U.S. and  Japanese  trade  analysts fear.  For most Europeans,  however,  1992
appears  to symbolize the  realization  of a dream,  a positive  turning  point  for  greater  international
cooperation,  not isolation.  The Community,  should  be more strongly positioned  to bring  Eastern
European  countries  gradually  into the world economy,  to the  benefit  of  global economic  growth
and  not at  the expense of developing  countries.  Such positive  developments  could  greatly ease
the  transaction  to a  more broadly  balanced  post bi-nolar  order  and  the eventual  enhancement  of
the  effectiveness  of multilateral  institutions  that  give such cooperation  operational  meaning.
The  Growine  Importance  of  Realonal  Coalitions
56.  A less dramatic  indicator  of the  trend  in restructuring  the  bipolar  security  order  is the
gradual  strengthening  of incipient  regional  security  arrangements  around  the Third  World.  If
successful,  these could  become important  mechanisms for  moderating  regional  tensions,
brokering  the peaceful  resolution  of conflicts,  and  mobilizing  international  opinion  for  or
against  the involvement  of external  powers in  regional affairs.  Despite  the rather  checkered
history  of regional  and  sub-regional  organizations  in Africa,  Asia,  the  Near East and  Latin
America,  their  role could rise  with  the passing of  the Cold War. 38 Under  the  right  conditions
they  conceivably  could  become the key structures  of a new multipolar  security  order.
57.  Ironically,  the  least effective  are  the three  pan-regional  organizations  have  been  in
existence  for  decades:  the Organization  of American  States, established  in  1948 now  has 28
members;  the Organization  of African  Unity,  established  in  1963 now has 50 members; and,  the
Arab  League,  established  in  1945 has 22 members.  All three  share ir  common  their  large size
and similar  charters,  which  focus  primarily  on political  cooperation  and  economic  and  so-'a!
development,  but  also provide  for  collaboration  in security  matters.  All three  also have  failed  to
meet even  the most minimum  expectations  of their founders  and  are  regarded  as little  more than
a convenient  forum  for  leaders to exchange  views and  issue broad  statements  on  the few
3/  Examples  of earlier  scholarship  on the  prospects for  regionalism  can be found  in: Regional
Politics  and  World Order,  Richard  A. Falk and  Saul H. Mendlovitz,  eds.,  (San Francisco:
W.H. Freeman,  1973).- 23 -
problems which they are typically powerless  to solve but about which there is a high degree of
consensus.
58.  Much more interesting, and of potential local and cumulative significance, are the
sub-regional organizations. The best example so far is the Association  of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN). Other more recent creations which also hold considerable promise include:
the Southern Africa Development  Co-ordination Conference (SADCC)  aild its more openly
security conscious but less institutionalized Organization  of Front-line States; the Gulf
Each derives its cohesiveness  from a vital and immediate security concern: Vietnam, Sou;th
Africa, Iran, and the Central American crisis.
59.  Their primary objectives in each case are to contain a more powerful adversary,
defend traditional principles of territorial integrity and sovereign equality, and resolve
outstanding disputes peacefully.  As security organizations they remain less involved with
military ma.ters--none  is a military alliance--and concentrate more on political activity.
Gradually, they are exhibiting growing cohesiveness  and their voices are acquiring international
authority.  In the process, their substantive agendas are also being extended into areas of trade
policy, human resource development, environmental management and other concerns.
60.  Other subregional coalitions are emerging which are less  preoccupied with an crgent.
and overriding security problem, notably: the Andean Pact, the Organization of Caribbean
States, the Economic Community of West  African States, the Maghreb group in North Africa,
and the fledgling South Asia Regional Council.
61.  Historically, there has rarely, if ever, been a successful regional organization --
including the European Economic Community and the Nordic Council --  whose members did
Pot come together and then stay together for reasons of collective security.  For without an
overriding political justification to cooperate, most economic  groupings seem unable to find the
right mix of shared costs and benefits to continue.  This may change, however, as issues of
economic vulnerability, environmental, risks, or access to science and technology, come to be
viewed by political leaders as essentially matters of national and regional security.- 24  -
62.  Policies of these sub-regional organizations  toward the U.S. and the Soviet Union will
continue to be, carefully balanced, although not usually symmetrical. 40 Individual members
may have special relations with one or the other, and in the African case the former colonial
powers maintain close bi-laterpl ties.  But a key mission of the coalitions is to moderate super
&ower  involvement in the region and to create political disincentives for unwelcome
intervention.  Before Gorbachev, the Soviets tended to view these coalitions with suspicion,
typically dismissing them as mere extensions of Western  influence.  Recently, however,
Moscow's  attitude toward these coalitions has become increasingly positive; the change with
regard to ASEAN is especially notable. 41  Washington  has a history of strained relations with
the Contadora Group although recent changes in U.S. policy toward the crisis in Central
America may ease tensions.  Toward the other coalitions U.S. policy has been generally
supportive.
63.  With the ebbing of Cold War perhaps we will again hear the theme that Moscow  and
Washington  briefly espoused during their last effort at detente: 'regional solutions for regional
problems.'  In the closing sections below it will be suggested that the chances of greater and
more enduring success this time will be greatly enhanced if local security and economic interests
can be effectively aggregated and if friendly external actors, notably the large multilateral
institutions, are preparee to help.
Alternatives  to Binolarlty
64.  Gorbachev and his advisers, for all their innovative thinking, and overtures to the
west have not articulated an  alternative to bi-polarity.  Their global vision, although heavily
clouded by domestic concerns, presumably still looks forward to the achievement of economic,
political, and cultural parity with the U.S. as the next big step toward the ultimate achievement
of world socialism.  Most other nations no doubt would prefer a multipolar alternative to either
Soviet domination or a continuation of the bi-polar system, however benign.
22/  Leslie H. Brown, "Regional Collaboration in Resolving  Third World Conflicts," Survival,
Vol. XXVIII,  No. 3, May/June  1986, pp.  208-20.
A/  Mohammed  Ayoob, "Regional  Security and the Third World,"  in Regional Security in the
Third World,  Mohammed Ayoob, ed., (Boulder, CO.: Westview,  1986), pp. 3-32.- 25 -
65.  Although  the  final  section of this essay suggests that  the major  multilateral  institutions
could  play  a role in facilitating  an evolution  to a multi-polar  order  that  is responsive  to the
needs  of developing  countries,  history  does not,  as noted earlier,  offer  much  of a guide.
Empires  are clearly  out of fashion,  but the  balance of power  model, on  the other  hand, still
enjoys  a number  of  admirers  and  perhaps  deserves a second  look.
66.  It  may be recalled  that  three  elements were essential  in European  balance of power
order  that  prevailed  during  most of  the  18th and  19th centuries:  respect for  the  rights of
sovereignty,  which  gave the  main actors a level playing  field;  diplomatic  institutions  to facilitate
rmediation, bargaining  and  regular  communication;  and,  limited  war as an instrument  of national
policy to right  occasional imbalances.
67.  Traditional  rights  of sovereignty  and  diplomatic  practice  still exist,  but  they  are
becoming  vestiges of an era when  communications  were slow, there  were few potent  non-state
actors beyond  the  Church,  and  publics  were less highly politicized  and  mobile.  When modern
wars have  been  attempted  as instruments  of national  policy for  political objectives,  notably  the
U.S. in Vietnam  and  the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan,  they  have been  typically
counterproductive.  The goals of local antagonists  engaged  in civil  and regional  conflicts,  on  the
other  hand,tend  to be much  more ambitious  but also rarely  realized.  Rather  than  serving as an
instrument  of adjustment  to stabilize  a regional  or international  regime,  modern  warfare  reflects
the clash of communal  values according  to race,  language, religion,  or custom.  That  so few  of
these  wars have  ended  with one side  totally subjugating  the other  is more a  tribute  to external
pressures  and  the nature  of modern  conventional  warfare  than  policies of restraint  by  the actual
combatants.  The  horrible  costs of  the seven year  war between  Iran  and  Iraq  is a notably
depressing  example.
68.  When western  international  security  analysts look at the classical European  balance  of
power  model they  fail  to interpret  its contemporary  relevance in  terms of what  it actually  was: a
regional  not a global security  order.  It emerged  out of the exhaustion  of intra-regional  strife,
perhaps  analogous  to the weariness  that  has appeared  among combatants  in several contemporary
regional  conflicts.  Within this  more limited framework,  perhaps a  new period  of creative
regional  diplomacy  will be possible.- 26 -
69.  When the first balance of power order took hold, the major powers of Europe could
stabilize their region while accumulating  empires with relative ease.  The highly pluralistic world
of the late 20th century is unlikely to come under the sway of another powerful regional
coalition. Regional balances, if they are to be stable and prosperous, will have to find ways of
adjusting not only to internal changes but also tc the external dynamics of an economically  and
technologically  volatile global system. Perhaps under such circumstances in the 1990s  the U.N.
and the Bretton Woods  institutions could function as the "balancers"  to achieve the "positive-
sum" outcomes within and among regional coalitions, hereby providing the basis for a new
multi-polar order?
70.  In this spirit, the next section of this essay briefly sketches several roles that
multilateral institutions, and particularly the international financial institutions, might perform.
They are proposed with two objectives in mind: to enhance the security of developing countries
as the necessary  precondition for sustained development; and, to strengthen the capacity and the
legitimacy of the multilaterals to play a more active role in shaping the vision and success  of a
post bipolar world security order.
111. PROMOTING  SECURITY  FOR DEVELOPMENT
71.  Four broad opportunities are opening for multilateral finance and development
institutions to help ease the transition to a new post bipolar global security regime that would
benefit developing countries:
(i)  Preparation of "watching  briefs" on regional and civil conflicts to aid long-range
planning and prepare for the expeditious introduction of financial and other forms of
assistance as a complement to peacekeeping  and peace-building processes, at the
earliest practical moment.
(ii)  Support of sub-regional and regional groups of countries in their experiments to
promote greater mutual security through cooperation in trade, environmental
management, communications,  education and various other economically  significant
linkages.- 27  -
(iii)  The  orderly  and  constructive  integration  of the  Soviet Union  and  other  CMEA  nations
into the world economy by co-financing of projects, and other joint activities,
particularly in those regions where conflicts are being resolved, such as southern
Africa  and  Southeast  Asia,  where  they already  have  a large  presence.  As a  prior  step,
if  the Bretton Woods  institutions were to open channels so as to acquire accurate data
from the Soviets and East Europeans on their loans and other economic transactions in
advance of reconstruction efforts this could strengthen their program planning and
analysis and offer modest opportunities to develop practical ties with the Eastern bloc.
(iv)  Design long range approaches for supporting and sustaining more effective developing
country participation in the new international regimes that will he requirad to
alleviate and overcome future global security threats, especially  such environmental
concerns as the degradation of the world's vital atmospheric, Marine tropical, water,
and biological resources.
Peace. Reconciliation, and Reconstruction
72.  In an address to a conference on the future of the World Bank, held in Washington  in
1986, former German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt called upon the Bank to take the leadership in
the reconstruction of war-torn Central America. 42 Given the complex local and international
politics of that crisis, it seemed a bold suggestion. Yet, in light of the IBRD's initial mission in
rebuilding Europe, it can not be deemed a novel one.  The multilateral development banks
could, if they chose, play such a role in several troubled regions of the developing world,
particularly if, as Schmidt maintained, the Japanese and Europeans would give their political
and economic support. Designing and carrying out such missions would, of course, require the
cooperation of the United Nations, the appropriate regional coalitions such as SADCC  or
ASEAN, and ad hoc inter-governmental groups such as Contadora.
73.  The key to such initiatives is "ripeness." As an analytic tool, the term can used to
explain why some conflicts result in peace through compromise while others just lead to more
41/  For background see: Donald S. Zagoria, "Soviet-American  Rivalry in Asia," in Korbonski
and Fukuyama, op. cit. pp. 247-72; Gorbachev set a new tone of hope  for improved
relations with his July 28, 1986 Vladivostok  speech on Soviet policy toward Asia.- 28  -
violence and  destruction.  It also focuses attention,  not on  the actual  negotiations,  but on
conditions  away  from  the the bargaining  table that  can reshape  perceptions  in a  manner  that
generates  room for  possible agreement.4 3
74.  For  multilateral  financial  institutions  to pay closer attention  to the dynamics  of
particular  regional  conflicts,  to discern  their  'ripeness'  for  settlement,  could serve two purposes.
Staff  would be better  prepared  to assist reconstruction  once  peace  had been  achieved.  Secondly,
and of  importance  to the pre-reconstruction  peace  processes,  staff  would be better  able to
convey  in a timely and  politically  helpful  fashion  various prospective  'incentives'  or 'rewards'
for  achieving  a peaceful  settlement.  In this  way they  might actually  contribute  to 'ripening'  the
situation  for  peaceful  compromise.
75.  The current  thaw in U.S.-Soviet  relations,  offers  an  historic  opportunity  for
multilateral  development  institutions  to expand  informal  contacts  with  all interested  external
powers  about  the need  and  feasibility  of programs  that  would effectively  meet the economics
and  security  needs of particular  countries.  Already,  the two superpowers  have successfully
cooperated  in bringing  about  the  withdrawal  of foreign  troops  from  Angola and an  agreement  to
grant  independence  to Namibia.  Similar joint  and  parallel  efforts  appear  likely  in Indo-China
and  the Horn  of Africa.4 4 Mozambique  is an obvious  candidate  where  the  security  situation  is
creating  terrible  distortions  in development  planning  and  foreign  assistance  where  both  the U.S.
and  the Soviets have good  relations.  In no  region are East-West  tensions rising,  even  in  the most
vital  and  increasingly  volatile  region of all, Eastern  Europe.
76.  Closer attention  to the early  stages of peace  building  in regions of  conflict  by  the
international  financial  institutions  could  prepare  them  to play a timely and  more effective  role
throughout  the process  of reconstruction,  reconciliation  and  re-integration.  By showing
sensitivity  to  latent ethnic,  religious,  or  other  tensions that  might  have sparked  or exacerbated
the original  conflict  the multilateral  donors  can help  to ensure  that  this process  is consolidated
4L/ Helmut  Schmidt,  "The International  Debt Crisis: A European  View," in the Future  of  the
World Bank.  Report  of the Conference  presented  by  the Overseas Development  Council,
June 23-24,  1986, Washington,  D.C.
4 3/  Richard  N. Haas,  "Ripeness and  the Settlement of  International  Disputes," Survival,  Vol.
XXX,  No. 3, May/June  1988, pp.  232-51.- 29  -
and  irreversible.  In such circumstances  the  justification  for  rebuilding  of infrastructure,  safe
sewerage  facilities  and  modern  communications  networks should  be assessed not only in terms
of economic  criteria  but also according  to whether  such projects  will have  such positive  effects
as facilitating  the  return  of refugees.
77.  A 'national  integration  impact  statement'  could  be salient  for  programs  in
Afghanistan,  Chad,  Mozambique,  Angola, Cambodia,  Ethiopia,  El Salvador an numerous  other
highly  fragile  war  ravaged  societies.  Inevitably  there  will be circumstances  where  it is
unrealistic,  even  dangerous,  for  a  multilateral  doinor, in effect,  to gather  intelligence  about
problems  of national  integration,  the resurgenice of  traditional  inter-state  conflicts,  and  the  risks
of escalation.  International  financial  institutions  are,  however,  already  affecting  internal  and
regional  political  and social  forces  whenever  they  undertake  policy-baqed  lending.  Assessing
the 'social  impact'  of adjustment  programs  in Ghana,  for  example,  obviously  raises different
issues than  in Angola or Cambodia,  but the  principal  is correct  and the  international  climate  for
developing  such approaches  seems to be improving.
Strengthening  Regional  Security
78.  At  a later  stage in the process  of building  regional  order  within  a multipolar  system,
another  function  for  multilateral  finance  and development  organizations  might  be to contribute
to the "balancing" process  within  and  among regional  coalitions.  If viable  regional  security
coalitions  are to develop,  new positive-sum  bargains will have to be devised.  The leading
multilateral  institutions  could  play a constructive  role in alleviating  key disparities  within
evolving regional  coalitions  and  offering  other  timely  incentives  so that  the  distribution  costs
and benefits  of greater  policy  coordination  among  members could be more  equitably  shared.
79.  The lead multilateral  institutions,  notably  the  World Bank,  might  also eventually
provide  financial,  technical  and  analytic  assistance to facilitate  greater  practical  cooperation
among  regional  coalitions  that  seek to solve common and  shared  problems  of environmental
natural  and  human  resource development.  Through  this process  incentives  might  also be found
to discourage  the erection  of trade  protectionist  or other  barriers  that could  destabilize  inter-
coalition  relations.- 30  -
80.  Constitutional  obstacles  may preclude  support  by the  lead global financial  institutions
for  regional  and sub-regional  inter-governmental  security  and  economic  organizations.  But,
growing  opportunities  to promote  collective  security  arrangements  as the basis for  regional
cooperation  and  development  in a post-bipolar  world  may justify  such  explorations.  New
arrangements  might  be considered  to strengthen  cooperation  with  the  regional  development
banks  in this  regard.
81.  Among the  existing  regional  or sub-regional  security  organizations,  the  Association  of
Southeast  Asian Nations  (ASEAN),  as already  noted, is the most successful.  Propelled  by
concern  over  the  U.S. withdrawal  from  Vietnam  in  1975, ASEAN's  political  cooperation  has not
been  matched  by  com.-arable economic cocperation,  which  has been  quite  modest.  Members  do
contend,  however,  that  coordination  in  national security  and  foreign  policies  has been
instrumental  in creating  conditions  conducive  to the tremendous  economic  growth and
development  of its members.45 This  spirit  now seems to be spreading  in the direction  of
formulating  ASEAN positions  toward  the current  round  of negotiations  for  the  General
Agreement  on Tariffs  and  Trade  (GATT).  In the event  of a  Vietnamese  withdrawal  from
Cambodia,  and  a resumption  of substantial  multilateral  development  assistance  for  the
reconstruction  of  Indo-China,  it might  be useful  to establish  regular communication  with  the
ASEAN secretariat  as part  of a long-term  approach  to promoting  a  peaceful  and  productive
regional  political  economy.
82.  The situation  among  the front-line  states in southern  Africa  is radically  different.  All
of  the members  of the SADCC have small vulnerable  economies,  and  several are  in shambles.  In
an alarming,  but not unreasonable,  analysis of the  costs of  the South African  destabilization
campaign  against SADCC countries,  Reginald  Green  estimates  that  direct  war  damage,  extra
defense  spending,  and several  other  items,  including  lost economic  growth,  add  up  to nearly  $28
44/ In May  1988 the author  prepared  a  memorandum at  the  invitation  of Soviet  Central
Committee  Member,  Yuri Arbatov,  on  ways that  the  U.S. and  the Soviet Union  might  work
in joint  and  parallel  fashion  to promote  peace and  national  reconciliation  on the  Horn of
Africa.  Discussions then  and  since suggest  that, for  all  the pain  and  bitterness  in that  war
ravaged  region,  it could  be the next  major  theater  for  East-West cooperation  and  one  where
the  multilateral  development  banks could play  a critical  supporting  role to a very  difficult
and  complex  peace  process.- 31 -
billion for the period 1980-1986.46  Much assistance has flowed to these countries over the
past decade but not nearly enough to ease the terrible deprivation, much less rebuild and extend
the basic infrastructure and communications  network that will be essential for regional security
and development.
83.  An obvious impediment to concerted multilateral assistance has been the opposing
involvement of the U.S. and Soviets in Angola. The recent progress in removing foreign troops
from that country has opened the way for a resumption of IMF and World Bank activities in
Angela later this year.  Southern Africa, after all, is the one conflict-ridden region of the
developing world where the U S.-Soviet interests converge, to the extent that both see apar.lOeid
in South Africa as the root problem and would gain from its abolition.  This fact, and the
political momentum of their recent shared diplomatic success suggest that this region offers a
prime opportunity to experiment with a major multilateral effort to prormote  regional security
and development.  Priorities need to be established, and in cooperation with SADCC and its
member governments. Mozambique would appear to be a logical candidate, particularly in light
of its recent successes  in attracting military assistance from Great Britain and the attention that
the UN donor group recently gave to the need to address security and development concerns
simultaneousl  r.
84.  A third region of enormous potential for attempting to promote regional security
through the funding of mutually beneficial functional cooperative programs, is South Asia.  The
fledgling South Asian Regional  Conference has been nearly stillborn as a result of the ethnic
conflict in Sri Lanka and the endless tensions between Pakistan and India.  Yet when the
organization was created it quickly adopted an agenda of issues, such as improvement of the
management of shared water resources, joint agricultural programs and environmental
improvements, that echo the development agendas of most large donors.  South Asia surely will
be vital to any future global security order.  For external multilateral development agencies to
seek a long term role at the nexus of regional security and mutually beneficial functional
cooperation, seems logical.
45/ Since 1982 the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies in Singapore  has sponsored a regional
Strategic Studies Program directed by and involving interdisciplinary teams of scholars from
all of  the ASEAN member countries.  Six volumes  on different aspects of  the ASEAN
experience have been published and distributed world wide by the Institute, whose
headquarters are Heng Mui Keng Terrace, Pasir Panjang, Singapore.- 32 -
85.  And  in the  Western Hemisphere,  the Central  American  Presidents  declared  last
August: "We have our  own approaches  to peace and  development,  but we need  help  in making
them  a reality."  The Sgecial Plan of Economic  Co-Operation  for  Central  America,  released  by
the United  Nations on  April  11, 1988, outlines  a strategy  that  is responsive  primarily  to the
needs and  aspirations  of the  regional  security  coalition.4 7 In light of the  groups  further
progress earlier  this  year,  and  the change of U.S. policy,  perhaps  the challenge  Helmut  Schmidt
raised nearly  three  years ago can soon be taken.
A  n  I  aSh.  2l1st Cv£1rx
86.  This essay has concentrated  on  the early  stages of a possible  major  restrazturing  of
the global seccurity order,  beginning  with more concerted  multi-lateral  efforns  to promote
regional  security  among developing  countries.  Taking a  longer-term  and  broader  view of  the
challenges that  will strain  international  relations,  there  will be a  need for  new multilateral
regimes capable  of  reducing  dangers  to global and  regional  atmospheric  and  water resources,
helping  nations adapt  to rapid  and  radical  technological  change,  dealing fairly  and  effectively
with  world  health  problems,  and coping  with other  issues.  These  will be essentially  political
undertakings,  although  with important  economic and  technical  dimensions.  Developing  countries
will have  major  stakes  in these  regimes but  relatively  little leverage  for  protecting  them.
Without such empowerment,  the  regimes will lack legitimacy and  the  problems  will go unsolved.
The role of multilateral  institutions  in this process  obviously  will be critical.
87.  Even  when  the Northern  countries  are prepared,  indeed eager,  for  developing  country
participation  in new international  conventions  two very  practical  impediments  typically  arise.
The  first  is the lack of technically  knowledgeable,  politically  influential,  experienced
international  negotiators  to authoritatively  represent  most developing  countries.  Lacking  the
indigenous  capacity  to extensively  analyze the  increasingly  complex  technical  issues inherent  to
most multilateral  arrangements,  these governments  are  unlikely to have  the  vision and
confidence  to conclude  major  new north-south  agreements.
4k/  Reginald  Green,  "Cutting  Off  the Flowers: the Macro-economic  and  Human Cost of War to
Southern  Africa,"  unpublished  monograph,  November  1986; and,  Killing  the  Dream: the
Political  and  Human  Economy of War in Sub-Saharan  Africa,  Institute  of  Development
Studies,  Discussion Paper  238, November  1987.- 33 -
88.  These politically  significant  technical  impediments  have  arisen often  in forums  such as
GATT,  in environmental  negotiations,  and  when communication,  intellectual  property,  and other
technically  complex  conventions  are undertaken.  It  is bound  to get much  worse as the
international  economic  and  security  agenda lengthens  and as the need  to strengthen  existing
international  regimes,  and  to create  others,  intensifies.  New co-horts  of men  and  women will
have  to be trained  not only  in the appropriate  substantive  areas,  but also in negotiating
techniques  and  in culturally  relevant  policy research  and  analysis.48 And  once the  negotiations
for  creating  or reforming  an  international  regime have  been concluded,  indigenotw capabilities
in developing  countries  to manage their end,  and to verify  adherence  by others,  have to be in
place.
89.  A  recent  call  for  "future  oriented  intell.gence  units" at  the very  top levels of
government  speaks very  much to this  point.4 9 Interest  among heads  of government  in
acquiring  this  badly needed  analytic  capacity  is growing;  political self-interest  and  national
security  require  it.  A question  is whether  the Bank and  other  multilateral  institutions  could
come up  with  a special  high level human  resource  development  strategy  targeted  to meeting
these needs.
90.  The second  impediment  is more obvious:  money.  Professor  Richard  Gardner,  the
distinguished  international  lawyer,  recently  called for  "practical  internationalism"  to build  new
and  urgently  needed  regimes of functional  cooperation  to deal  with five  priority  global  issues:
nuclear  proliferation;  narcotics  control;  the spread  of AIDS; environmental  problems;  and
4/  Guillermo  Fernandez  de Soto,  Emma Torres,  Juan  Alberto  Fuentes,  Gabriel  Siri and  Hector
Dada,  "Special Plan of Economic  Co-operation  for  Central  America," unofficial  translation,
preliminary  version,  11 April  1988.
4f/  This  task  has been  undertaken  with considerable  success, albeit  on a small scale, by  the
Centre  for  Applied  Studies  in International  Negotiations,  I la,  Avenue de la Paix,  1202
Geneva.  Programs for  training  developing  country  negotiators  covers many  issues.  An
April 6,  1989 letter  from  the director,  Jean F.  Freymond  is indicative:  "Finally as regard
Africa,  we have  organized  a  workshop  to contribute  to the  training  of African  mediators
directly  involved  in trying  to identify  solutions  to one  of the conflicts  in southern  Africa.
It has once more  confirmed  that  training  nationals  to solve their own  conflicts  is finally
more important  than  offering  good offices.- 34 -
population growth.50 This appeal was, appropriately, directed toward an American audience-
-specifically a new Administration in Washington. Promoting the U.S. national interest through
multilateral diplomacy and international cooperation is a good cause, particularly after President
Ronald Reagan's unilateralist tendencies. Yet it is unrealistic to expect U.S. leadership on these
several fronts, even allowing for the U.S. special interests in this particular list.  The legitimacy
and political consensus that are essential for such regimes will have to be created incrementally,
from 'the bottom up', and probably with then infusion of sufficient new external resources to
structure the complex positive sum games involving all of the parties to the agreement.
91,  The difficulties in developing a broad base of support for international regimes has
been neatly illustrated by Harvard economist Richard Cooper, in a little noticed 1986
monograph for the Brookings  Institution  "International Cooperation in Public Health as a
Prologue to Macroeconomic  Cooperation.: 51 Intrigued by hoW  long and difficult was the task
of achieving better coordination of macro-economic  policies among a relatively small set of
industrial democracies, Cooper decided to analyze the history of international cooperation in
public health where highly successful regimes exist.  These regimes might well be described as
"strategic' for the number of lives saved.
92.  What Cooper re-discovered was that it actually took nearly a century, from the time
that scientists had identified the causes of such non-controversial threats as cholera and yellow
fever, to negotiate and implement programs for their eradication- Just getting international
consensus  in practical knowledge,  along with shared objectives, took decades.  This necessary
condition for international cooperation has not yet been achieved in macro-economic  analysis, or
in environmental science, population science, and the other priorities on Gardner's list.  Perhaps
an effective treaty to ban the further use of ozone damaging Chloroflura carbons will signal an
awareness of the urgency to forge consensus  as the need and scope of new environmental
regimes.
_2/  F.R. Sagasti, "National Development  Planning in Turbulent Times: New Approaches and
Criteria for Institutional Design," World Develooment,  Vol. 16, No. 4, April 1988 pp.
431-448.
IQ/  Richard N. Gardner, "Practical Internationalism,"  Foreign Affairs, Vol. 66, NO. 4, April
1988, pp.  827-45.- 35 -
93.  The real impediment to reaching the international health accords, however, had to do
with the conflicting views over the relationship between alternative remedies and outcomes. In
the case of cholera, those who accepted the prescription of ambitious and expensive programs in
public health, not coincidental, were the more economically  advanced countries that could
afford the cure.  Poor countries insisted on the less expensive, and ineffective, policy of
quarantine.  Getting the costs for all down to an acceptable level, along with universal
acceptance of the certainty of the benefits, required another fifty years of international
negotiations.
94.  By the time smallpox was eradicated, a practical achievement that tome scientists
contend rivals the splitting of the atom as the most outstanding scientific achievement of the
20th century, the World  Hlealth  Organization was in place to admialister the campaign.
Furthermore, the Soviet Union and the United States ,greed in the mid-1960s to cooperate on
the development and provision of the vaccine, a singular event that, in retrospect, appears as a
harbinger of detente.  This case history is worth pondering as scientists and policy makers meet
to consider how the international community might deal with the growing threat of the so-called
greenhouse effect, the Aids pandemic, or the more highly political issue of Palestinian
membership in the World  Health Organization. A greater wil'ingness of the Soviet Union and
the U.S. to work together in solving such issues could greatly benefit developing countries.
95.  Somehow,  short-cuts to building viable international regimes will have to be
discovered.  Leadership by multilateral development institutions in this process is at least
conceivable. While they  presumably would wish to defer to the appropriate specialized
agencies, such as the United Nations Environment Program or the World  Health Organization,
on particular issues, there is the common problem of finance and the need for a more strategic
approach to problem solving by all multilateral institutions.  Mobilizing international capital,
helping to arrange debt reduction for environmental conservation or converting debt into
endowments for policy relevant training and research, use of blocked currencies, and other non-
traditional mechanisms  for engaging the necessary participation of the developing countries in
these regimes, could open critical bottle-necks for the specialized agencies.  Moreover, the
multilateral development institutions would bring a fresh practical perspective to some of the
tougher international economic/security problems that lie ahead.  Greater inter-agency
cooperation, including a more synergistic division of labor, might result.- 36 -
EngaginE  the Soviet U"non
96.  It is iroric that so much of this essay has focused on Soviet policy, a government that
does not even belong to key multilateral economic institutions while largely ignoring the United
States, the principal architect and largest contributor to these institutions.  But the Soviet Union
is today providing the impetus for a re-ordering of the bipolar global security system, perhaps
opening the way for creative multilateralism. If the process continues, including major reforms
within the Soviet bloc, international debate is bound to intensify over whether the Soviet Union
should strive for membership in the GATT, IMF, and World  Bank and, if it wishes, be granted
admission.5 2
97.  This subject was recently addressed in a joint study by four senior fellows in
international economic policy at the Institute for East West  Security Studies in New York.  The
team, with members from Poland, Hungary, Italy and the U.S., declared:
In our understanding, there is primarily a strategic political rationale for both the
Soviet Union and the West  to seek Soviet rapprochement with these organizations.
This strategic rationale is to use the inherent potential of these arrangements and
organizations  for cooperative conflict management on a wide range of issues and to
involve the Soviet Union in multilateral designs aimed to improve the international
economic setting.  Step-by- step Soviet accession would be a learnine proCeSS  for both
sides. 53
The authors further conclude that
...full-fledged Soviet membership in the various international organizations is not and
cannot be on the agenda of the moment.  Launching a process of mutual fact-finding,
identifying the conditions of incremental accession and the range of tradeoffs is,
EL/ Richard N. Cooper, International CooDeration in Public Health as a Prologue to
Macroeconomic  CooDeration,  Brookings Discussion  Paper. in International Economics,
No. 44, March 1986.
2/  "The Soviet Union  and the Bretton Woods  Institutions," by Richard Feinberg, forthcoming
Overseas Development  Council publication.- 37 -
however, of immediate importance, so that the present political momentum will not be
lost and the conditions in will be, criteia  D2aLift, ripe for the Soviet Union to join
GATT in the early 1990s  and the IMF and the World  Bank in the second half of the
coming decade.
98.  Even such a gradual process cannot be accomplished without at least tacit acceptance
by the United States.  And this certainly would  have not been forthcoming before the recent
series of Summit meetings between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev.  It was,
after all, barely two years ago that the Bank's president reportedly was rebuffed by the then
U.S. Treasury Secretary James Baker for saying "why not?" to the question of Soviet
membership.  However, if the current trend continues, helped by progress in resolving
peacefully regional conflicts, an historic opportunity to bring the Soviets into the world
economic system, as the Institute of East-West Security Studies team envisions, may be at hand.
99.  Already in New York theories abound in the financial community that attribute Soviet
willingness  to sign the intermediate range nuclear arms control agreement, conduct summitry on
terms more acceptable to the U.S., and to withdraw from Afghanistan, as indirect ways to
gaining access to Western and Japanese capital and technology. The June 1988 issue of
Indeoendent Investor, for example, predicted that in 1989, "The Soviets will start to cash in on
several years of goodwill. They will want to borrow a lot of money...and they will get it."
While this politically important economic drama unfolds there are quiet steps that the Bretton
Woods  institutions could undertake to forge cooperative links with the "new thinkers" in
Moscow.
100.  Although contacts between the Bretton Woods  institutions and Soviet citizens have
been restricted since the onset of the Cold War, there is obviously a need for all multilateral
institutions to assess their stakes in a post-bipolar  order and how they might contribute to
managing a smooth transition. At issue is how to design a strategy for exploring Soviet
capabilities and intentions regarding a larger role in the globaC  economy in ways that will not
arouse unrealistic expectations in Moscow  or undue concern in Western  capitols.  Given the
complexity, political sensitivity, and protracted nature of official negotiations that might
eventually be held on the terms of Soviet membership, informal but systematic 'scholarly'
consultations at this stage, involving planning and research staff from the Bretton Woods- 38  -
institutions, Soviet scholars and development experts, and perhaps a few independent Western
scholars, could have immediate and long- term benefits.
101  As noted earlier, in U.S.-Soviet relations there has been a long history of unofficial
high-level policy relevant dialogues. These exchanges have served two purposes: to reduce
miscalculation  by seeking to shed light on the key forces that shape the changing political and
economic environments in which each government must choose its foreign policy priorities and
actions; and, to explore joint or parallel steps that could build mutual confidence and open the
way to greater bilateral cooperation. Under Gorbachev, those exchanges have become far more
frank, searching and constructive.
102.  Recently, one of the oldest of these exchanges, involving  the United Nations
Association  of the U.S.A. has shifted the focus of its parallel studies program with the Soviets
away from bilateral arms control and economic issues to the role of multilateral institutions. 54
Other examples of the widening vommunication  with the Soviets about issues of particular
interest to the Bretton Woods  institutions were the meetings in December 1987  and November
1988 of Africanists from U.C.L.A. and the Sovie. Academy's Africa Institute on "U.S.-Soviet
Cooperation for Africa,"  and the previously noted projects currently underway with mixes of
Soviet and U.S. international economists under the auspices of the Overseas Development
Council in Washington,  and the Institute for East-West Security Studies in New York. 55
Perhaps similar scholarly exchanges could be undertaken by the international financial
institutions along with an expansion of contacts  with knowledgeable  Soviets to improve the
analysis of developing and Eastern European country  economies where they have major stakes.
103.  Of a more practical nature, the IMF and the World Bank could benefit from Soviet
data as they prepare to -e-enter Angola.  In designing an effective adjustment program it would
seem prudent to elicit the views of Soviet experts on the state of the Angola's economy, the
nature and plans for Soviet lending and aid to that country, which already owes Moscow some
$3 billion.  The Soviets could also help in nearby Mozambique the chronic security threats have
5/  Bissolino,  Lang, McCarthy and Zuiwowska,  op. cit.
14/  Summary records of the UNA-USQ-UNA-USSR meetings about the role of the United
Nations and other multilateral institutions can be obtained from Edward C. Luck, UNA-
USA '85  Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10017.- 39 -
severely hurt the effectiveness of World Bank and other development programs.  With the recent
improvement in East-West relations and the willingness  of several major national donors to call
for concerted international action to help improve Mozambiquen  security, perhaps that
multilateral financial institutions could consult more directly with the Soviets on these issues.
Other opportunities for establishing regular contact with Soviet aid officials at the country
operations level could emerge over the next twelve months in Ethiopia, Cambodia, and even
Afghanistan. Obviously the most compelling  need for information sharing between IMF/'.Vorld
Bank officials and Soviet analysts regarding national trade, investment and other economic
trends has to do with preparing and implementing  country programs in Eastern Europe, above
all in Poland.  In this fashion a serious diialogue  could begin that would establish common
knowledge bases and mutual confidence that will be essential should the membership issue
eventually come to the fore.
Swords into Plowshares?
104.  It is tempting to inject in this essay a recommendation  that multilaterai development
institutions adopt, as a research topic, the "international  economic impact of the reduction in
world military expenditures" that logically should accompany an ending of the Cold War.  One
would assume, at least, that the resolution of regional conflicts in the developing world would
have an important effect on regional arms races.
105.  Over the past four years, in fact, the rate of increase in world military expenditures
appears to have slowed.  The most recent year-to-year increases appear to be less than half that
of the 1980/84 period, in constant 1984 dollars. One would like to think that the increasing
tendency of Third World  leaders to speak out against the arms race, regionally and globally, as
an unconscionable  drain on resources desperately needed for development, is playing some role
in this shift.  British analyst Chris Smith's research on the trend confirms that developing
countries have been cutting back, but only slightly. The reasons seem to have more to do with
the behavior of a few heavily indebted buyers and with the substitution of lower cost domestic
production for high cost imports. 56
5/  The UCLA Soviet Academy of Sciences  project on Africa recommended  cooperative
ventures in  agricultural development; environmental protection; mineral resources and
utilization; communications;  relations  with the Southern African Development  Coordination
Conference; and, nuclear non-proliferation in Africa.  Copies of  the summary joint
Continued on next page- 40 -
106.  The depressing  reality is that in  1987, world  military  expenditures  may have  topped
$930 billion,  a sum, equivalent  to the income of 2.6 billion  people  in the 44 poorest  countries.57
Anyone  who has followed  the protracted  U.S.-Soviet  arms control  negotiations  can  be under  no
illusion  about  the difficulty  of effecting  major  reductions,  even  under  the  best diplomatic
circumstances.  Throughout  the  world large and  politically  influential  military-economic
structures  remain  in  place and  are  ready to respond  to the still painfully  real  security  needs  of
developing  countries.  It is, alas, unrealistic  to imagine  that  military  symptoms will be  treated
ahead of curing  the underlying  political and social ills.
107.  Gathering  ard  analyzing  data on militarv  expenditures  in  order to  build  theories  about
disarmament  vs. development  trade-offs,  that actually  have little  political salience  for  the
governments  concerned,  has been a favorite  exercise  among academic  peace  researchers  for
years.  This is, however,  not a  task for  the research  departments  of multilateral  development
institutions.  Monitoring  international  arms flow3 and  production  trends  involving  developing
countries,  including  a growing  number  of Third  World procducers and  exporters,  is relatively
easy and could  be a useful  indicator  of regional  tensions and  of development  plans gone awry
and  would complement  the multilateral  peace built  on efforts  of the  multilateral  financial
institutions  noted  earlier.
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statements  can  be obtained  from  Michael  Intriligator,  Center  for  International  and  Strategic
Affairs,  University  of California,  Los Angeles, Los Angeles,  CA 90024-1486.
/  Chris  Smith,  "Weapons for  the Third  World," Peace and  Security,  Summer  1987, pp.  2-4.
5-7/ Sivard,  op. cit.  p.5.- 41 -
IV.  CONCLUDING  OBSERVATIONS
108.  The main hypothesis of this essay is that if the Cold War era is passing then important
opportunities may be at hand for the multilateral financial institutions to gear some of their
efforts to support incipient peace processes in conflict plagued regions of the Third World.
Through such efforts economic growth and the reduction of poverty could be significantly
improved for several seriously affected countries, the trend of improving East-West relations
would be ad-anced, and the authority and effectiveness of tthe  multilaterals for bridging security
and development issues could be strengthened.
109.  Until now the Bretton Woods  institutions have had little choice but to treat regional
and global security issues as largely exogenous to iheir programs of economic and technical
assistance. This policy will no longer be necessary  or desirable if recent trends in U.S. - Soviet
relations and the accelerating diffusion of power within and among nations continue.  Although
the emergence of a new era in world politics is, at best, only in its earliest stage, this essay has
sought to highlight those aspects that appear germane for those multilateral institutions with a
special interest in developing countries.
110.  In the complex and uncertain transition to whatever system eventually succeeds
bipolarity, the international politics of macroeconomic  policies are likely to be increasingly
volatile and salient to the design and implementation of adjustment programs.  By focusing
initially on ways to help advance the universally welcomed peace building processes  that are
underway or may be imminent in Africa, South Asia, Indo-China, Central America, as well as
the reform movements in Eastern Europe, the international financial institutions may be able to
acquire the capabilities and legitimacy  to deal with security related issues. This could also be
managed on a scale and in a manner that would not distort resource flows and or the fiscal and
monetary standards that govern them.
111.  If the Bretton Woods  institutions are to assume greater leadership in a more pluralistic
global community the changing dimensions  and dynamics of national, regional and global
security concerns will have to be incorporated more effectively in their strategic planning and
operations.  Several steps in this direction have been suggested: helping to "ripen' peace
processes with timely assessments  of the economic gains from national reconciliation; providing
assistance to reinforce peace processes  and reduce the risk of reversibility; and perhaps playing- 42 -
the roles of 'broker  and balancer"  by allocating resources to facilitate the positive-sum bargains
that will be required to stabilize a nation or region.  Although several regions in the developing
world could benefit by security sensitive initiatives by the multilateral  financial institutions, the
most critical targets of opportunity may actually be in Poland and elsewhere in East Europe.
112.  The security agendas of all nations are changing and will be quite different in the
1990s  from those that have prevailed since the founding of the Bretton Woods  institutions four
decades ago.  Threats to the environment, instantaneous global communications,  gaining access
to changing science and technology, and deepening economic interdependence are rapidly
eroding naLional  sovereignty and blurring distinctions between foreign and domestic policy for
governments. Ironically, the attention and influence accorded developing countries in a post-
bipolar security system may decline, as the competition for global influence by the USSR and
the U.S. ebbs and the major powers t- come more preoccupied with their own domestic and
regional economic and political issues.  Whether or not this occurs, there can be little doubt that
the importance of the World Bank and other multilateral institutions in representing the interests
of developing countries on the world stage and for dealing for the more diffuse long term
environmental and other dangers will increase significantly as the new century dawns.PRE  Workira  Paper  Series
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